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Abstract—Tools that synchronize passwords over several user
devices typically store the encrypted passwords in a central
online database. For encryption, a low-entropy, password-based
key is used. Such a database may be subject to unauthorized
access which can lead to the disclosure of all passwords by an
offline brute-force attack. In this paper, we present PALPAS,
a secure and user-friendly tool that synchronizes passwords
between user devices without storing information about them
centrally. The idea of PALPAS is to generate a password from a
high entropy secret shared by all devices and a random salt
value for each service. Only the salt values are stored on a
server but not the secret. The salt enables the user devices to
generate the same password but is statistically independent of the
password. In order for PALPAS to generate passwords according
to different password policies, we also present a mechanism that
automatically retrieves and processes the password requirements
of services. PALPAS users need to only memorize a single
password and the setup of PALPAS on a further device demands
only a one-time transfer of few static data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of using passwords for user authentication
on the Internet is cost-effective for services and easily com-
prehensible for users. However, the key challenge for users
is to choose a strong password for each service and never
reuse it for another service. This is essential for the security,
but the wide adoption of passwords on the Internet makes
it impossible for users to memorize the required amount of
different strong passwords. To mitigate this conflict of having
user-friendly and secure passwords one possible solution is
storing some data locally on the user’s device, which can be
the passwords themselves or information to compute them.
However, this requires an additional protection mechanism
to ensure that only the legitimate user is able to access the
data, e.g., by a proof of knowledge or possession. Another
problem of storing data locally is that it is only available
on a single device but nowadays users have multiple devices
like smart phones and tablets. Furthermore, the data is not
static. Passwords get added, changed, or removed. Thus, the
data must be synchronized between devices to ensure that
users can access their services at any time and any place. The
data can be synchronized manually by directly connecting the
An extended abstract of this work appears in the proceedings of ARES
2015.
devices or in a more convenient and user-friendly way through
a synchronization server over the Internet.
There exist many solutions for the generation of individ-
ual passwords, secure password storage, and password syn-
chronization, but they have serious drawbacks. The common
paradigm of password synchronization is protecting passwords
via encryption with a password-derived key and storing them
at servers on the Internet. This bears the risk of security
breaches at the synchronization servers where adversaries copy
the encrypted data and perform offline attacks (cf. [14], [20]).
Hence, there is a need for a synchronization scheme that is on
the one hand not vulnerable to such attacks and on the other
hand user-friendly with respect to the amount of information
users need to memorize and the number of actions users need
to perform to synchronize their passwords.
The protection of local and/or remote data as well as the user
authentication at the synchronization server are usually based
on a user-chosen (master) password. This enables various
attacks based on web vulnerabilities and phishing attacks in
which users are tricked into submitting their password to an
adversary (cf. [4], [28]). Hence, there is a need for a solution
that strictly separates the duties of providing data and privacy
protection as well as user authentication.
Existing approaches to generate random passwords do not
consider the password requirements of services, but this is
crucial to create strong passwords. Usually, a default char-
acter set and password length are used, which hopefully fit
the requirements of all services. Otherwise, users need to
adapt the password or configure the password generator for
the particular service. In both cases, users need to find the
password requirements at the service’s website or end up in an
exhausting trial and error approach to find out which kinds of
passwords are accepted. This situation is very inconvenient and
leads users to use the first password accepted by the service
and not the strongest and most appropriate one. Hence, there
is a need for an automatic mechanism that allows password
generators to retrieve and process the password requirements
of services without requiring any user interaction.
In this work we present PALPAS, a novel password tool that
creates strong, service-specific passwords and synchronizes
them between devices via a central server. However, it does
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not store or use any passwords on the server and is therefore
not vulnerable to phishing attacks or security breaches.
More specifically, we make the following contribution re-
garding the open issues described above:
• We present a synchronization scheme that shares data be-
tween devices through a synchronization server to enable
them to compute the same passwords. However, the data
is statistically independent of the passwords and hence
does not reveal any information about them. Moreover,
the user authentication at the synchronization server is
not based on passwords but on public key cryptography.
Therefore, a security breach at the synchronization server
is non-critical, because there are no passwords that could
be stolen by an adversary.
• We describe an approach to use different, independent
high entropy secrets for password generation, data and
privacy protection, and user authentication, which pro-
vides a maximum of security on the one hand but is still
easily manageable and user-friendly on the other hand.
• We provide a common description of password policies
to specify the password requirements of services in a
standardized way. We describe a solution to create and
distribute the policies. This allows us to finally provide
a mechanism which automatically retrieves the password
requirements of arbitrary services to create strong and
service-specific passwords. It requires no user interaction,
except that users need to specify for which service the
password should be created.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II we sum-
marize related work. We describe PALPAS on a conceptual
level in Section III and provide more details about its imple-
mentation in Section IV. In Section V we present a detailed
security analysis of our concept and finally conclude the paper
in Section VI. The appendix includes detailed protocol flows.
II. RELATED WORK
Password managers like KeePass [25] and LastPass [19] as
well as the browser built-in password managers of Chrome
and Firefox [22] encrypt the passwords before storing them
at servers on the Internet. The encryption key is derived
from a user-chosen master password. A security breach at
a synchronization server (cf. [20]) would allow adversaries
to steal the encrypted data and to perform offline brute-force
attacks. In essence, protecting passwords by another password
and storing them on servers cannot be the foundation for a
secure password synchronization.
Hash-based approaches like PwdHash [26] allow users to
create different passwords for services by hashing a master
password and the name or the URL of the service. Unfortu-
nately, an adversary who stole a password can perform a brute-
force attack to obtain the master password and thereby gener-
ate all user’s passwords. Password Multiplier [15] performs
additional steps to strengthen the master password, which
increases the costs for a brute-force attack. Nevertheless, these
hash-based approaches cannot be used to generate a new
password for the same service, which is e.g. necessary after
a password breach. The authors propose to use an additional
user-chosen input for each service, which is included in the
hashing, but this has the disadvantage that users then need to
memorize this input for each service. Thus, the existing hash-
based approaches are not a feasible solution because they still
require users to memorize a lot of information.
Approaches which are using hardware tokens [27], [35] or
mobile devices [29] for authentication have the disadvantage
that users always need to carry an additional device. Further-
more, such solutions require changes on the infrastructure of
the service. The weak development of other authentication
mechanisms than passwords (cf. [5] for a survey) shows that
service-side changes are a major obstacle for the wide adoption
of authentication schemes.
Single sign-on (SSO) like Facebook Connect [13] allows
users to authenticate themselves with a single password once
and access multiple services without being prompted to log in
at each service again. This can reduce the number of passwords
users have to memorize but the adoption of SSO is still very
limited [30]. Furthermore, SSO bears the risk of phishing
attacks [36] and studies found out that users have several
concerns and misconceptions about SSO and are not feeling
comfortable with giving control of their passwords to external
services [31], [32]. SSO has also serious privacy issues [10],
because the SSO identity provider is aware of where and when
a user performs a login. In summary, SSO does not solve
the problem of managing many passwords and leads to new
problems like the privacy issue.
III. PASSWORDLESS PASSWORD SYNCHRONIZATION
In this section we describe PALPAS on a conceptual level.
We explain how PALPAS creates passwords for services,
how the individual password requirements of each service are
met during the password generation, how the passwords are
synchronized between several user-devices, and finally how the
various data is protected from unauthorized access. Technical
details about the implementation, the used encryption schemes,
the used key sizes, and so forth are presented in Section IV.
Detailed protocol flows can be found in the Appendix.
A. Password Generation
PALPAS does not store a password as typical password
managers do. It (re-)computes a password every time the user
wants to log in to a service. PALPAS uses completely random
passwords but ensures that they comply with the password
PRG
Salt
Seed PGRandom Password
Password Policy
Fig. 1. Password Generation. The Pseudorandom Generator (PRG) generates
randomness based on a seed and a salt value. The Password Generator (PG)
derives a password from the randomness and ensures that it complies with a
password policy specifying the password requirements of the service.
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requirements of a service. It also uses a different password
for each service and never reuses it. All that together allows
to have an individual and strong password for each service.
As illustrated in Figure 1, a password is computed in
two steps: First, a (cryptographically secure) Pseudorandom
Generator (PRG) generates a pseudorandom value based on
a seed and a salt value. Second, a Password Generator (PG)
derives a password from the pseudorandom value and ensures
that it complies with a given password policy. The password
policy specifies the password requirements of the service. The
PRG and the PG are deterministic, thus, using the same seed,
salt, and password policy, the same password is generated. We
present more details about the implementation of the PRG and
the PG in Section IV-C and IV-E.
The seed S is a common secret shared by all user devices.
It is randomly generated when the user uses PALPAS the
first time and it must be transferred by the user to all his or
her devices, but only once. In Section III-E we provide more
details how to do this in a convenient way. To protect the
seed from unauthorized access it is encrypted using a secret
KMPW derived from a user-chosen master password (MPW).
It is important to stress that this secret is only used for the local
data protection and local user authentication. More precisely,
it ensures that only the user is able to access the seed. The
secret KMPW is neither stored on a server nor used for any
kind of data protection in which the data leaves the device.
The objective of the salt is twofold. First, PALPAS uses
a different salt value for each service to create different
passwords for the services. Second, changing the salt for a
service allows generating a new password for it, which is
necessary in case of a password breach or regular required
password changes. The salt is chosen by PALPAS and com-
pletely random. Consequently, it is statistically independent of
the password and its knowledge does not allow to infer any
user-, service-, or password-related information.
B. Password Policies
A password policy defines the password requirements of
a service. It specifies the minimum and maximum password
length, the allowed character sets, and additional constraints
of the required characters. For instance, a password policy
specifies that passwords must have at least 8 and a maximum
of 10 characters, can consist of upper- and lowercase letters
and digits, and must contain at least one digit.
PALPAS uses a separate password policy for each service,
but instead of putting the burden of creating these policies
on the user, we provide an automatic mechanism to process
and retrieve the password policies of arbitrary services. We
propose a community approach to create the password polices
and distribute them through a central service. This has the
benefit that it is independent from the services and does not
require their contribution. The basic concept is that users create
a password policy for a service once and make it available for
other users by distributing it through the central service.
We developed a common description for password poli-
cies to specify the password requirements of services in a
standardized way (cf. Section IV-D for an example). This
builds the foundation to automatically retrieve and process
password policies without any user interaction. We introduce
the Password Policy Service (PPS) where applications like
PALPAS can automatically request the policy of an arbitrary
service. The PPS provides a form for users where they
can enter the password requirements of a service. The PPS
then automatically creates the corresponding password policy
and publishes it. To ensure the correctness of the password
policy the PPS performs multiple verifications. It performs
plausibility and sanity checks to ensure, for instance, that
the generated passwords have at least a certain threshold
of entropy. Moreover, it requires that at least several users
enter the same password requirements of a service before a
password policy gets published. In addition, the PPS provides
a reputation system to allow users to rate the policies and
to assist users in deciding whether to trust or not to trust
in a certain policy. Applications like PALPAS should also
perform sanity checks to ensure that a generated password
has a minimum level of entropy.
There is an issue when a service changes its password
requirements but that only affects users that change the pass-
words. It requires that users submit the new password require-
ments to the PPS to update the password policy. PALPAS
retrieves the password policies for the services only once and
stores them on the device. In case the user wants to have a
new password for a service PALPAS checks if there is a newer
password policy to ensure that the password complies with the
current password requirements.
In summary, our approach enables applications to automati-
cally retrieve and process password policies, without requiring
users to manually search for the password requirements at
the service’s website and configure the application. The first
PALPAS users of a service still have to manually enter the
requirements but we expect that after an initialization phase
policies for all popular services are available. In Section
IV-D we provide more details regarding the implementation
of password polices.
C. Password Synchronization
As described in Section III-A a password for a service is
computed from the seed, a salt, and a password policy. The
seed is available on all user devices. The password policy can
be retrieved from the PPS and is stored on the device after
the first download. To enable all user devices to compute the
same password for a service only the salt needs to be shared
between the devices.
We introduce the Salt Synchronization Service (SSS), a
central service that synchronizes the salt values between a
user’s devices. For each service or rather for each password
of the user, the SSS stores a separate salt and an associated
identifier. The identifier allows PALPAS to request the salt
for a particular service. In the interest of simplification, we
assume that the identifier is the URL of the service. In case
the user wants to log in to a service, PALPAS requests the
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TABLE I
SECRETS USED BY PALPAS
Secret Objective Generation Properties
S Password generation - Random
- First use of PALPAS
- Same for all devices
- Manually transfered by the user only once
KMPW Local data protection and
local user authentication
- Derived from master password
- Every use of PALPAS
- Same for all devices
- Entered on each device
- Entered for every use of PALPAS
KE Remote data and privacy
protection
- Random
- First use of PALPAS
- Same for all devices
- Manually transfered by the user only once
KAuth Device authentication - Random
- First use of PALPAS on a device
- Different for all devices
- Generated by each device
- TAuth manually transfered only once
corresponding salt from the SSS and computes the password.
A detailed protocol flow can be found in the Appendix.
This approach also allows PALPAS to determine if a user
already has an account at a particular service by checking if
there is a salt for the service stored at the SSS. To synchronize
a new password, PALPAS just adds the new salt and the
identifier to the SSS. After synchronizing with the SSS, all
user devices are able to compute the password and to perform
the login. The same applies if the user updates the password
for a service, PALPAS stores the new salt value using the
old identifier at the SSS. This automatically makes the new
password available to all other user devices.
Using the URL of a service as identifier leads to privacy
issues as the SSS and potential adversaries would gain infor-
mation about the services used by the user. Therefore, PALPAS
obtains the identifier hashing the URL with a secret value KE.
This secret key is randomly generated during the first use of
PALPAS. It must also be transferred by the user to all his
or her devices when adding a new device. This can be done
together with the seed.
Besides the password, a login to a service also demands
a username. PALPAS also provide means to synchronize the
usernames between the user’s devices. Usernames are sensitive
information as they might reveal a user’s real name on the one
hand and give adversaries an advantage in social engineering
attacks. On the other hand, knowledge of a username might
allow to connect a user with his actions e.g. in forums or on
dating sites. Thus, PALPAS protects usernames by encrypting
them using KE from above and stores them on the SSS.
In summary, for each service, used by the user, the SSS
stores a triple consisting of the salt, the salt identifier, and the
encrypted username.
D. User Authentication at the SSS
We need to ensure that only the legitimate user is able
to store, update, or delete his or her salt values at the SSS.
Common approaches for user authentication at synchroniza-
tion servers are password-based, which makes phishing attacks
very likely. PALPAS uses public key based authentication with
an independent secret KAuth (and a corresponding public key)
for the user authentication at the SSS. An authentication key
pair is automatically generated on each user device. When
the user uses PALPAS the first time, PALPAS automatically
generates a key pair and uses it to create an account at the
SSS. This happens completely transparent to the user. The
SSS only stores public keys and hence an attack against the
SSS leaks no information usable to hijack a user account. If
the user wants to set up PALPAS on a further device, he or she
requests an authentication token TAuth from the SSS, which is
used by the new device to register its new authentication secret
K ′Auth at the SSS. This allows to revoke single authentication
key pairs in case of loss. The authentication token TAuth is
transfered together with seed S and secret KE during set-up.
E. Separation of Duties for Data and Privacy Protection and
User Authentication
PALPAS needs to ensure that only the legitimate user is able
to compute his or her passwords and to access the necessary
data to do so. Furthermore, PALPAS must protect any personal
information about the user to ensure his or her privacy. As
summarized in Table I, PALPAS uses four different secrets to
achieve the goals. The seed ensures that only the legitimate
user is able to compute the passwords, even if adversaries
get access to the salt values. The secret KMPW protects the
data stored on devices and ensures that only the user who
knows the MPW can access the local data. Usernames and salt
identifiers might reveal personal information about the user;
therefore they are protected by KE before storing them on
the SSS. Finally, to ensure that only the legitimate user can
access (and hence edit) the data stored on the SSS, each device
authenticates itself with a different secret KAuth. The seed S,
the secret KE, and the secret KAuth are randomly generated
with sufficiently high entropy to make brute-force attacks
meaningless. Only the secret KMPW is derived from a user-
chosen MPW. However, KMPW is only used for local data
protection and local user authentication and we use common
techniques to make brute-force attacks impractical (see Sec.
IV-A). In essence, this provides a maximum of security while
keeping PALPAS as user-friendly as possible.
As already mentioned, to set up a new device the user needs
to transfer the seed S, the secret KE, and the authentication
token TAuth to the new device. All this data can be encoded
together into a QR code [8], a Base64 string, or transferred by
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Fig. 2. Overview. The user (U) wants to log in to the service (S). PALPAS
(P) prompts the user to enter his or her master password to access the seed. It
retrieves the salt value from the Salt Synchronization Service (SSS) and the
password policy from the Password Policy Service (PPS) for the service and
finally computes the password.
manual file transfer. In particular the QR code-based approach
is today well-known to users and very convenient.
F. Summary
In this section we described how PALPAS works and intro-
duced all involved participants. Figure 2 provides an overview
and shows the information flow between the participants.
The user (U) needs to enter his or her MPW to enable
PALPAS (P) to access the protected seed. To create a password
for a service (S) PALPAS determines the identifier of the
service and requests the corresponding salt value and username
from the Salt Synchronization Service (SSS) as well as the
password policy from the Password Policy Service (PPS).
Finally, PALPAS computes the password.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The previous section described PALPAS on a conceptual
level. We now present more technical details regarding the
implementation and used technologies.
We implemented PALPAS as a proof-of-concept in Java
and the SSS as well as the PPS as a Java web service. The
SSS provides a SOAP-based interface for PALPAS to create
an account as well as to manage the account and the stored
data. The implementation of the user authentication is based
on Apache CXF and Bouncy Castle. The PPS provides a
RESTful API for applications to retrieve the policies. The
source code will be made available under an open-source
license at www.palpas.info.
A. Seed Generation and Protection
The seed is generated gathering 256 bits of entropy from a
strong random number generator (in our case the Java class
SecureRandom). It is locally stored, encrypted with secret
KMPW using AES-256. The secret key KMPW is derived from
the user’s MPW using the PBKDF2 function [18].
B. Salt Generation and Synchronization
Using the URL of a service as identifier for the salt would
raise privacy issues as argued above. Thus, PALPAS generates
identifiers as id = SHA-256(KE‖url) to protect a user’s
privacy. The parameter url represents the URL of the service,
in detail, the domain name, for instance http://example.org.
The parameter KE is a 256 bit key, generated during set-up
and shared by all user devices. Prepending the secret KE adds
sufficient entropy to the input to make a brute-force search for
a valid preimage, containing a URL intractable.
C. Pseudorandom Generator
We implemented the PRG using AES in CBC mode. The
seed S is used as key and the salt as input for the cipher.
The ciphertexts form the pseudorandom output. We iteratively
increment and then encrypt the salt value until enough random
bits for the password generation are produced.
D. Password Policies
We specified an XML-based data format for password
policies to provide a standardized description of the password
requirements. XML is widely supported by many platforms
and programming languages. This ensures an easy adoption
of our solution for other password tools. We provide a brief
example of a password policy in Listing 1. The example policy
allows passwords that have at least 6 and at most 12 characters.
The policy specifies a character set of lower- and uppercase
letters as well as digits and requires that the password must
contain at least one digit. For instance, this policy allows
passwords like Ha1K3A and QSJe1Kf4qYt.
<PasswordPolicy>
<MinLength>6</MinLength>
<MaxLength>12</MaxLength>
<CharacterSets>
<CharacterSet name="LowercaseLetters">
<Characters>abc...xyz</Characters>
</CharacterSet>
<CharacterSet name="UppercaseLetters">
<Characters>ABC...XYZ</Characters>
</CharacterSet>
<CharacterSet name="Digits" minOccurrence="1">
<Characters>0123456789</Characters>
</CharacterSet>
</CharacterSets>
</PasswordPolicy>
Listing 1. Password Policy. It specifies the minimum and maximum length
of a password as well as the allowed character sets and additional restrictions.
E. Password Generator
The PG maps the random value generated by the PRG to
a password which complies with a given password policy (cf.
Section III-A). As example we consider a password policy that
specifies a password length of 10 characters and a character
set of uppercase and lowercase letters as well as digits. Thus,
the character set has 26+26+10 = 62 characters in total. To
derive a password of length ` using a character set of size
|characterset| = φ, the PG takes 100 + dlog2(φ`)e bits
from the pseudorandom output and determines their decimal
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value modulo φ`. The resulting value is represented as `
base-φ numbers. In the above example the PG would take
100+dlog2(6210)e = 160 bits, performs the modulo reduction,
and splits the result in 10 numbers between 0 and 61. Each
base-φ number then serves as an index in the character set.
For instance, 51 = Z in our example character set. Using 100
bits more than required to get a number > φ` guarantees an
only negligibly biased distribution over the character set. More
specifically, for each value x in the character set, the proba-
bility that x is chosen deviates from 1/φ at most by 2−100.
Please note that consequently adding fewer additional bits (e.g.
20 bits) recognizably increases the probability of small indexes
to occur. Thus, it would produce biased passwords.
The password policy may specify additional restrictions, for
example, that a password has to contain at least one digit.
To support this setting while ensuring that passwords are
uniformly distributed, we use rejection sampling. We generate
a password form the pseudorandom output and check if it
fulfills all restrictions. If not, the password is discarded and
we use the next block of pseudorandom output from the PRG.
The new password is generated and verified. This process
is repeated until the password fulfills all restrictions and the
verification succeeds. While this process in theory might never
terminate, it terminates in practice after a few iterations. E.g.,
in our running example, the probability that in τ consecutive
iterations a password is generated that contains no number is
((1 − 10/62)12)τ = 0.12τ < 2−3τ . This probability vanishes
exponentially fast in the number of iterations. Please note
that a straight-forward approach of considering restrictions
during the password generation (e.g., generate n−1 characters,
check if they contain a digit, if not select a digit for the n-th
character) would produce biased passwords.
F. Protecting the Usernames
We use AES-256 in CBC mode with secret KE to encrypt
usernames before storing them on the SSS. Each username is
encrypted separately using a different initialization vector (IV)
to prevent that the same ciphertexts are produced for the same
usernames. Both, ciphertext and IV are additionally protected
using a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[23]. Ciphertext, IV, and HMAC are stored on the SSS for each
service in addition to the salt value. The encrypted usernames
can be retrieved by all a user’s devices in the same way as the
salts, using the identifier of the service.
Please note that for simplification we only consider that a
user has one account at each service (i.e., one username per
service) for our prototype. However, our scheme can easily
support several user accounts per service storing multiple
salt values and encrypted usernames for the same identifier.
PALPAS retrieves this information as usually by requesting
the data stored on the SSS for a particular identifier. Instead
of returning a single salt value and username, the SSS would
return a list of salt values with the corresponding encrypted
usernames. PALPAS decrypts the usernames and presents a
selection dialog to the user.
G. User Authentication
As already mentioned, the user authentication at the SSS is
not password-based but uses public-key cryptography with a
random authentication secret KAuth and corresponding public
key. In detail, we are using TLS with client authentication
for the user authentication at the SSS. Each user’s device
generates a new key pair comprising a public and a private
key. During the account creation at the SSS, PALPAS sends
a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) [24] to the SSS. The
CSR contains only the public key and no further personal
information. The SSS creates an X.509 certificate based on
the CSR and transmits it to the device. The public key is
bound to the account and stored in a list of trusted keys
which are allowed to access and modify the salt values.
Each user’s device must add its own public key. To add an
additional device an already registered device must request
an authentication token TAuth from the SSS. The user must
transfer the token to the new device. The new device creates
its own key pair and a corresponding CSR that includes TAuth.
Then it sends the token to the SSS. Hence, the authentication
token ensures that only the user is able to add new devices.
Authenticating each device by its own public key has the
advantage of fine-grained revocation. In case of theft or loss
the user can revoke the access for a device by removing the
public key from the list of trusted devices. Please see Section
V-A for further details.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION
In this section we provide a detailed security analysis of
PALPAS. We analyze the case of theft of a device, a phishing
attack, security breaches at the services and the SSS, and
finally a SSS failure.
A. Resistance to Theft or Loss of User Device
Storing passwords or data to compute them, like PALPAS
does, bears the risk that devices are lost or get stolen, in
particular in case of mobile devices. In that case, an ad-
versaries might get access to the stored data. Although any
mobile device is equipped with protection mechanisms such
as passwords, PINs, or pattern locks, multiple surveys showed
that only two third of the users use them [6], [11]. Even worse,
unlock codes are often predictable and can be determined by
simple guessing [3], [34]. In essence, locking mechanisms for
devices are an important aspect but one cannot rely on them
as a protection mechanism for sensitive data.
As already described, PALPAS uses a MPW to derive
the secret KMPW to encrypt the data stored on the device.
However, this is only a first line of defense and increases the
cost and effort for adversaries to obtain the data. It cannot
be excluded that adversaries obtain the data carrying out a
brute-force attack, especially if the user used a weak MPW. If
encryption would be the only protection mechanism, users had
to immediately change all their passwords because it would
be just a question of time until adversaries find out the correct
MPW. PALPAS has a second line of defense.
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PALPAS computes a password using the seed and a salt.
Either having the seed or the salt does not enable to compute
the password. Thus, even if adversaries obtain the seed from
a stolen device they need to get the salt values stored at the
SSS to compute the user’s passwords for the services. Each
user’s device uses a different authentication secret KAuth, in
detail, a different secret and public key, for the authentication
at the SSS. As described in Section IV-G the SSS stores the
public key of each device that is authorized to access the salt
values. In case of a theft or loss, the user can revoke access
for this device. Thus, if the MPW provides at least protection
until the device’s public key is revoked, the adversary is unable
to retrieve the salts using the stolen device and consequently
unable to compute the passwords. This gives the user enough
time to change the seed on all devices and register the new
passwords at all services.
B. Resistance to Phishing Attacks
Although password managers provide means against phish-
ing attacks, they are also vulnerable to such attacks by
themselves as soon as they use an online service, e.g., to
synchronize passwords. The well-known procedure of luring
users to fraud websites to gather usernames and passwords
works also fine for password managers or synchronization
services that use password-based authentication and provide
a login through a web application. Our approach of using
public key authentication or rather TLS client authentication
is insusceptible against phishing attacks [2], [7], because there
is simply no password that can be phished.
C. Resistance to Security Breaches
Numerous examples [1], [9], [12], [20], [33] tremendously
showed the danger and impact of security breaches. Therefore,
we analyze our approach regarding the threat of encountering
a security breach at the SSS and/or at different services.
1) Security Breach at the Service(s): In the first attack sce-
nario we consider that adversaries get access to the password
database of a service and in particular to the password of a
user. The password was generated by the PG as described
in Sections III-A and IV-E. The functionality of the PG and
the policy are publicly available. Hence, adversaries are able
to invert the PG and obtain (parts of) the pseudorandom
output, generated by the PRG. However, it follows from the
pseudorandomness of the PRG that knowing the output it is
still computationally hard to learn (1) the seed and (2) the
output of the PRG on input of the same seed but with a
different salt value. Thus, adversaries are unable to compute
other passwords from a stolen password.
The same applies in case that adversaries get access to pass-
word databases of multiple services and extract the passwords
of a user at each service. As already mentioned, adversaries
are able to obtain the corresponding PRG outputs, but they are
unable to learn the seed or salt values.
Finally, we consider adversaries who are able to access the
password database of a service multiple times, in particular
after a password change. In detail, for an arbitrary time period
the adversaries get a list of passwords generated by PALPAS
using the same seed but different salt values. Following the
same argumentation as above, adversaries are able to invert
the PG and obtain the corresponding pseudorandom output,
but neither the seed nor the salts.
In essence, if adversaries are able to steal passwords, they
cannot perform an offline attack to obtain information to
compute other passwords. Due to the fact that our scheme
generates an individual password for each service, adversaries
can also not reuse the stolen password for other services.
Please note that in theory adversaries can try all combina-
tions of the seed and the salt and test if they generate the same
password as stolen from the service. However, in practice there
are a number of obstacles. First, the fact that the seed and the
salt are 256 bit random values results in a search space of
2256 ∗ 2256 = 2512 bits. Second, even for a strong password
policy that uses a 128 character set and length 20 passwords,
there exist only 2140 possible passwords. Assuming that no
further restrictions are applied and every seed-salt combination
leads to a valid password, there are on average 2372 different
seeds and salts that result in the same password. To find the
correct seed-salt pair, an adversary has to verify that the seed
and the salt are correct. The only way for the adversary to do
this is to perform an online attack in which he computes a
password for a different service and tests if it is accepted by
that service. This is complicated by the fact that adversaries
do not necessarily know which services a user uses. More
importantly, services block accounts after a certain amount
of wrong password attempts. Thus, even for computationally
unbounded attackers an online attack is not applicable.
2) Security Breach at the SSS: In the second attack scenario
we assume that adversaries are able to access the information
stored at the SSS. In detail, the salt values, the encrypted
salt identifiers, the encrypted usernames, and the public keys
of the user’s devices. The public keys for authentication are
useless because the adversaries already have access to the
SSS. The salts are randomly chosen values, independent of
the passwords and do not reveal any information about the
seed, the used services, or the corresponding passwords. To
be precise, it follows from the pseudorandomness of PRG
that only knowing the salt, guessing the output of PRG is
infeasible. Therefore, adversaries are not able to generate any
passwords. Thus, an offline attack is impossible.
Similar to the first scenario, in theory adversaries could
brute-force the seed. This time, they even have the advantage
of knowing a list of valid salt values. This reduces the search
space to 2256 but it still forces adversaries to verify each seed
in an online attack. In detail, for every seed and stolen salt the
adversaries get a valid PRG output and password. Therefore,
they need to verify the password with a service to check if
they found the right seed. However, they do not know to which
services the salts belong to and services restrict the number of
login attempts. Using an additional brute-force attack against
the secret KE with complexity 2256 would allow an adversary
to learn username and service URL. But they still need to test
every seed online. Thus, an online brute-force attack is not
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TABLE II
SECURITY BREACHES
Security Breach Seed Salt Salt Identifier Username Password Challenges to obtain the data
Service ◦ ◦ ◦ •a •a - Seed and salt must be brute-forced (2512 bit)
- Various valid seeds and salts
- Password must be verified online
SSS ◦ • •b •b ◦ - Seed must be brute-forced (2256)
- Secret KE must be brute-force (2256)
- Various valid seeds
- Password must be verified online
SSS and Service ◦ • •b •b •a - Seed must be brute-forced (2256)
- Secret KE must be brute-force (2256)
- Various valid seeds
- Password must be verified online
Table 2 summarizes which (protected) data is obtained (depicted by •) and not obtained (depicted by ◦) by adversaries in the respective security breach as
well as which obstacles need to be overcome to break PALPAS.
a Maybe encrypted by the service (out of scope).
b Encrypted with secret KE.
feasible, even for computationally unbounded attacker.
In summary, a security breach at the SSS might allow
adversaries to brute-force the secret KE which affects the
user’s privacy but does not reveal any information to obtain
the passwords of the user.
3) Security Breach at the Service and the SSS: In the third
attack scenario we assume a security breach at the service and
the SSS. Adversaries would now obtain the password used at
the service and the data stored at the SSS. As described in the
first scenario, adversaries can compute the PRG output from
the password by inverting the PG. However, it follows from the
pseudorandomness of the PRG that it is still computationally
hard to learn the seed in this scenario.
An offline brute-force attack against the seed now becomes
theoretically possible, because adversaries now have a pass-
word and a limited list of possible salt values. In case of a 256
bit seed as used by PALPAS such a brute-force attack would
take 2255 evaluations of the PRG. Moreover, such a brute-
force attack would find many different valid seeds: Continuing
the example from the first case, the attack would find 2116
seeds on average. Hence, again an online phase is required
to verify every single seed from this set. This again leads to
the same challenges as in scenario 2, i.e., either guessing the
service for a salt or running a brute-force attack on the secret
KE. We noticed that knowing the service and the username
would theoretical allow a known-plaintext attack. However, in
practice, e.g. using ciphers like AES, that is not an issue and it
leads back to a brute-force attack to obtain KE. In summary,
even in case of a security breach at the SSS and the service
adversaries are unable to perform an offline brute-force attack.
4) Summary: The three attack scenarios are summarized in
Table II. It shows which data adversaries obtain in the case of
a security breach in each attack scenario and what adversaries
need to do to obtain the seed and break PALPAS. The common
approach of encrypting passwords allows adversaries to run
offline attacks and to brute-force the encryption key. Further-
more, they can always verify if their attack was successful. Our
approach does not allow this, because any possible seed (and
salt) generates a valid password for a service. Thus, offline
attacks are not possible. Adversaries are forced to choose a
seed (and a salt), generate the corresponding password, and
check if it is accepted by a service to know if they found the
correct seed.
D. Resistance to SSS failure
The password generation is based on the seed and salt values
stored on the SSS. Without being able to retrieve the salts form
the SSS PALPAS is not able to compute the password. Reasons
for an unavailable SSS can be technical problems but also
denial-of-service attacks. The reliability and fail-safe stability
of the SSS can be ensured by redundancy of the hardware
components to make technical problems very unlikely. Also
denial-of-service attacks can be tackled by running multiple
instances of the SSS on different locations, like common
Content Delivery Networks do. Furthermore, there exist a lot
of research on detection and defense mechanisms of denial-
of-service attacks [21], [37]. In summary, there exist multiple
technical and organizational means to provide a reliable SSS.
It would have been possible to deploy a client-side solution
to cope with the problem. The salt value needs only be changed
if the password is changed and we can safely assume that
this happens very rarely. Hence, PALPAS could cache the salt
values, which would allow generating the password even if the
SSS is unavailable. However, this stands in direct contrast to
the security advantage in case of theft or loss as described in
Section V-A. Therefore, we decided against this solution and
left it for future work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented PALPAS that generates strong
and service-specific passwords and synchronizes them between
the user’s devices in a secure manner. We provided a detailed
security analysis and showed among other things that (1)
security breaches at the SSS and/or at the services do not
allow adversaries to obtain the passwords, (2) the SSS is not
vulnerable to phishing attacks because the user authentication
is not based on passwords, and (3) even in case of a device
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theft the passwords are protected. We also showed that the use
of different secrets to provide data and privacy protection as
well as user authentication improves the overall security and is
still user-friendly. Users only need to remember a single master
password. During setup of a new device some data has to be
synchronized manually once. This can be done by scanning a
QR code. We presented a solution that allows the password
requirements of services to be automatically taken into account
in the generation of strong passwords without any user inter-
action. The proposed standardized description, the automatic
retrieval, and the distribution of password policies build a
foundation and an open solution for various applications to
include the password policies and to improve password-based
authentication in the Internet.
In the future, we plan to investigate a peer-to-peer approach
for the salt synchronization in which the devices exchange
the salt values directly. This has the benefit that we do not
need a central server for the synchronization as done by
the SSS in our case. Furthermore, we plan to analyze a
machine-learning approach to generate the password policies
automatically. We envision a tool that extracts the password
requirements automatically from the services’ websites and
creates the corresponding password policies.
For future work one might also consider a trade-off between
security, in case of theft or loss, and availability, in case of
unavailability of the SSS, caching salts. Caching could be
limited and the salts could be encrypted locally. PALPAS
could also be enhanced by more sophisticated authentication
schemes like context-based authentication [16], [17]. The
user’s context, e.g. the location, could be part of a sophisticated
cache erasing algorithm which deletes the cache if the device
leaves known locations. Furthermore, the caching could be
enhanced by pushing the salt values instead of fetching them
on demand. More precise, if a user’s device updates the salt at
the SSS, the SSS could automatically push the new value to the
other devices. This way all devices have the latest salts even if
the SSS was unavailable with high probability. A sophisticated
caching mechanism could protect the user in case of device
theft or loss as well as guaranteeing availability even if the
SSS is unavailable.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the European Union
within the 7FP project FutureID (ICT-318424) and by the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) un-
der grant 639.073.005.
REFERENCES
[1] Adobe. Important Customer Security Announcement,
2013. http://blogs.adobe.com/conversations/2013/10/
important-customer-security-announcement.html.
[2] A. Alsaid and C. Mitchell. Preventing phishing attacks using trusted
computing technology. In Proceedings of INC 2006, Sixth International
Network Conference, Plymouth, UK, July 2006, pages 221–228, 2006.
[3] P. Andriotis, T. Tryfonas, G. C. Oikonomou, and C. Yildiz. A pilot study
on the security of pattern screen-lock methods and soft side channel
attacks. In L. Buttya´n, A. Sadeghi, and M. Gruteser, editors, Sixth ACM
Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks,
WISEC’13, Budapest, Hungary, April 17-19, 2013, pages 1–6. ACM,
2013.
[4] K. Bhargavan and A. Delignat-Lavaud. Web-based attacks on host-
proof encrypted storage. In E. Bursztein and T. Dullien, editors, 6th
USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT’12, August 6-
7, 2012, Bellevue, WA, USA, Proceedings, pages 97–104. USENIX
Association, 2012.
[5] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. van Oorschot, and F. Stajano. The quest
to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web
authentication schemes. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2012, 21-23 May 2012, San Francisco, California, USA, pages 553–
567, 2012.
[6] D. V. Bruggen, S. Liu, M. Kajzer, A. Striegel, C. R. Crowell, and
J. D’Arcy. Modifying smartphone user locking behavior. In L. Bauer,
K. Beznosov, and L. F. Cranor, editors, Symposium On Usable Privacy
and Security, SOUPS ’13, Newcastle, United Kingdom, July 24-26, 2013,
page 10. ACM, 2013.
[7] R. Clayton. Insecure real-world authentication protocols (or why
phishing is so profitable). In B. Christianson, B. Crispo, J. A. Malcolm,
and M. Roe, editors, Security Protocols, 13th International Workshop,
Cambridge, UK, April 20-22, 2005, Revised Selected Papers, volume
4631 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 82–88. Springer,
2005.
[8] Denso Wave. Quick Response Code, 2015. http://www.qrcode.com.
[9] eBay Inc. eBay Inc. to ask eBay users to change passwords, 2014.
http://blog.ebay.com/ebay-inc-ask-ebay-users-change-passwords/.
[10] S. Egelman. My profile is my password, verify me!: the privacy/conve-
nience tradeoff of facebook connect. In 2013 ACM SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’13, Paris, France, April
27 - May 2, 2013, pages 2369–2378, 2013.
[11] S. Egelman, S. Jain, R. S. Portnoff, K. Liao, S. Consolvo, and D. Wagner.
Are you ready to lock? In G. Ahn, M. Yung, and N. Li, editors,
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, Scottsdale, AZ, USA, November 3-7, 2014,
pages 750–761. ACM, 2014.
[12] Evernote Corporation. Security Notice: Service-wide Password Reset,
2013. https://evernote.com/corp/news/password reset.php.
[13] Facebook. Add Facebook Login to Your App or Website, 2015. https:
//developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login.
[14] P. Gasti and K. B. Rasmussen. On the security of password manager
database formats. In S. Foresti, M. Yung, and F. Martinelli, editors,
Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security, Pisa, Italy, September 10-12, 2012.
Proceedings, volume 7459 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
770–787. Springer, 2012.
[15] J. A. Halderman, B. Waters, and E. W. Felten. A convenient method
for securely managing passwords. In A. Ellis and T. Hagino, editors,
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web,
WWW 2005, Chiba, Japan, May 10-14, 2005, pages 471–479. ACM,
2005.
[16] E. Hayashi, S. Das, S. Amini, J. I. Hong, and I. Oakley. CASA: context-
aware scalable authentication. In L. Bauer, K. Beznosov, and L. F.
Cranor, editors, Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS
’13, Newcastle, United Kingdom, July 24-26, 2013, page 3. ACM, 2013.
[17] R. J. Hulsebosch, M. S. Bargh, G. Lenzini, P. W. G. Ebben, and
S. M. Iacob. Context sensitive adaptive authentication. In G. Kortuem,
J. Finney, R. Lea, and V. Sundramoorthy, editors, Smart Sensing and
Context, Second European Conference, EuroSSC 2007, Kendal, England,
October 23-25, 2007, Proceedings, volume 4793 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 93–109. Springer, 2007.
[18] B. Kaliski. PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification
Version 2.0. RFC 2898, Sep 2000. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898.
[19] LastPass Corporate. LastPass - The Last Password You Have to
Remember. https://lastpass.com.
[20] LastPass Corporate. LastPass Security Notification. https://blog.lastpass.
com/2011/05/lastpass-security-notification.html/.
[21] A. Mishra, B. B. Gupta, and R. C. Joshi. A comparative study of
distributed denial of service attacks, intrusion tolerance and mitigation
techniques. In European Intelligence and Security Informatics Confer-
9
ence, EISIC 2011, Athens, Greece, September 12-14, 2011, pages 286–
289. IEEE, 2011.
[22] Mozilla. Firefox Accounts/Sync Protocol. https://github.com/mozilla/
fxa-auth-server/wiki/onepw-protocol.
[23] C. Namprempre, P. Rogaway, and T. Shrimpton. Reconsidering generic
composition. In P. Q. Nguyen and E. Oswald, editors, Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT 2014 - 33rd Annual International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen,
Denmark, May 11-15, 2014. Proceedings, volume 8441 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 257–274. Springer, 2014.
[24] M. Nystrom and B. Kaliski. PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7. RFC 2986 (Informational), Nov 2000. https:
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986.
[25] D. Reichl. KeePass Password Safe. http://keepass.info.
[26] B. Ross, C. Jackson, N. Miyake, D. Boneh, and J. C. Mitchell. Stronger
password authentication using browser extensions. In P. McDaniel,
editor, Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore,
MD, USA, July 31 - August 5, 2005. USENIX Association, 2005.
[27] F. Stajano, G. Jenkinson, J. Payne, M. Spencer, Q. Stafford-Fraser, and
C. Warrington. Bootstrapping adoption of the pico password replacement
system. In B. Christianson, J. A. Malcolm, V. Matya´s, P. Svenda,
F. Stajano, and J. Anderson, editors, Security Protocols XXII - 22nd
International Workshop Cambridge, UK, March 19-21, 2014 Revised
Selected Papers, volume 8809 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 172–186. Springer, 2014.
[28] B. Stock and M. Johns. Protecting users against xss-based password
manager abuse. In S. Moriai, T. Jaeger, and K. Sakurai, editors, 9th ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security,
ASIA CCS ’14, Kyoto, Japan - June 03 - 06, 2014, pages 183–194.
ACM, 2014.
[29] H. Sun, Y. Chen, and Y. Lin. opass: A user authentication protocol resis-
tant to password stealing and password reuse attacks. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, 7(2):651–663, 2012.
[30] S. Sun, Y. Boshmaf, K. Hawkey, and K. Beznosov. A billion keys,
but few locks: the crisis of web single sign-on. In A. D. Keromytis,
S. Peisert, R. Ford, and C. Gates, editors, Proceedings of the 2010
Workshop on New Security Paradigms, Concord, MA, USA, September
21-23, 2010, pages 61–72. ACM, 2010.
[31] S. Sun, E. Pospisil, I. Muslukhov, N. Dindar, K. Hawkey, and
K. Beznosov. What makes users refuse web single sign-on?: an empirical
investigation of openid. In L. F. Cranor, editor, Symposium On Usable
Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’11, Pittsburgh, PA, USA - July 20 - 22,
2011, page 4. ACM, 2011.
[32] S. Sun, E. Pospisil, I. Muslukhov, N. Dindar, K. Hawkey, and
K. Beznosov. Investigating users’ perspectives of web single sign-on:
Conceptual gaps and acceptance model. ACM Trans. Internet Techn.,
13(1):2, 2013.
[33] Twitter Incorporated. Keeping our users secure, 2013. https://blog.
twitter.com/2013/keeping-our-users-secure.
[34] S. Uellenbeck, M. Du¨rmuth, C. Wolf, and T. Holz. Quantifying the
security of graphical passwords: the case of android unlock patterns.
In A. Sadeghi, V. D. Gligor, and M. Yung, editors, 2013 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’13, Berlin,
Germany, November 4-8, 2013, pages 161–172. ACM, 2013.
[35] K. A. Varmedal, H. Klevjer, J. Hovlandsva˚g, A. Jøsang, J. Vincent,
and L. Miralabe´. The offpad: Requirements and usage. In J. Lopez,
X. Huang, and R. Sandhu, editors, Network and System Security - 7th
International Conference, NSS 2013, Madrid, Spain, June 3-4, 2013.
Proceedings, volume 7873 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
80–93. Springer, 2013.
[36] C. Yue. The devil is phishing: Rethinking web single sign-on systems
security. In V. Paxson, editor, 6th USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale
Exploits and Emergent Threats, LEET ’13, Washington, D.C., USA,
August 12, 2013. USENIX Association, 2013.
[37] S. T. Zargar, J. Joshi, and D. Tipper. A survey of defense mechanisms
against distributed denial of service (ddos) flooding attacks. IEEE
Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 15(4):2046–2069, 2013.
APPENDIX
This appendix provides detailed figures and descriptions of
the protocol flows for the setup of PALPAS, registration of a
new user device, synchronization of an additional password,
SSS P U
Generate 
S, KE, KAuth, CSR
MPW
Derive KMPW
CSR
Certificate CP
Fig. 3. Setting up PALPAS.
login to a service, and finally the update of a password. The
following diagrams contain the user (U), the Salt Synchroniza-
tion Service (SSS), PALPAS (P) running on a user’s device,
and an exemplary service (S).
A. Setting up PALPAS
After installing and starting PALPAS on a device the user
needs to select and enter a master password (MPW) (cf. Figure
3). PALPAS derives the secret KMPW from the MPW and uses
it to encrypt any data that will be stored on the device (e.g. the
seed). Subsequently, PALPAS generates the seed S, the secret
KE, the secret KAuth, and a corresponding Certificate Signing
Request (CSR). It sends the CSR to the SSS in order to create
a new account for the user. The SSS creates a certificate based
on the CSR and sends it to PALPAS. The certificate is used to
authenticate the user to the SSS. More precise, PALPAS uses
the certificate for a TLS client authentication to the SSS.
B. Adding a Device
The procedure to use an additional device with PALPAS
comprises two steps: First, the user requests an authentication
token from the SSS using an already registered device. Second,
the user registers his or her additional device at the SSS using
TAuth
CSR', TAuth
Certificate CP' 
S, KE, TAuth
MPW
Generate 
K'Auth, CSR' 
S, KE, TAuth
Derive KMPW
Fig. 4. Adding a new user device.
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the authentication token. As depicted in Figure 4), PALPAS
(P) requests a token TAuth from SSS and encodes it together
with the seed S and the secret KE as a QR code (or stores
it in a file). The user installs PALPAS (P’) on the new device
and enters a master password. Please note that the master
password is only used to protect the local data. Therefore, the
user can choose different master passwords for the devices.
Subsequently, the user transmits the seed S, the secret KE,
and the token TAuth to the new device (e.g. scanning the QR
code or by manual file transfer). PALPAS (P’), running on the
new device, generates a key pair and a corresponding CSR’.
It sends the CSR’ and the token TAuth to the SSS to register
the device. Finally, the SSS creates a new certificate for P’
and sends the certificate to it.
C. Synchronizing a new Password
Figure 5 shows the synchronization of an additional pass-
word with PALPAS. For instance, in case the user wants to use
a new service. As a first step, the identifier (id) of the service is
computed (cf. Section IV-B). Subsequently, PALPAS generates
a salt and the corresponding password for the service. The user
sets the password at the service and PALPAS stores the salt
at the SSS associated with the identifier and the encrypted
user data. Other user’s devices are able to generate the same
password after synchronization with the SSS.
SSS
Password
Saltid
P S
SSS
P
U
Token
P' 
CSR', Token
Certificate CP' 
S, KE, Token
MPW
Generate 
K'Auth, C R' 
S, KE, Token
Derive KMPW
Determine id
Generate 
Salt, Password 
Fig. 5. Synchronizing a new password.
D. Logging into a Service
If the user wants to login to a service, PALPAS determines
the identifier of the service (cf. Figure 6). Then PALPAS
requests the corresponding salt from the SSS and computes
the password for the service. Finally, the login is performed
and the user has access to the service.
E. Updating a Password
Updating a password which is synchronized by PALPAS
is a combination of the procedures performed for the login
and the synchronization of a new password. As illustrated in
Figure 7, first, PALPAS determines the identifier of the service.
Second, it retrieves the corresponding salt by the SSS. Third,
it generates the password and the user logs into the service.
Fourth, PALPAS generates a new salt and the corresponding
password. Fifth, the user updates the password at the service.
Finally, if the password change at the service was successful,
SSS
Password
id
P SSaltid
SSS Password
Salt'id
P S
id
Saltid
Password'
Determine id
Generate Password
Generate 
Salt', Password' 
Determine id
Generate Password 
Fig. 6. Logging into a Service.
PALPAS stores the new salt value at the SSS using the same
identifier as before.
SSS
Password
id
P SSaltid
SSS Password
Salt'id
P S
id
Saltid
Password'
Determine id
Generate Password
Generate 
Salt', Password' 
Determine id
Generat  Password 
Fig. 7. Updating a Password.
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